In Tijs et al. (2006) a new family of cost allocation rules is introduced in the context of cost spanning tree problems. In this paper we provide the first characterization of this family by means of population monotonicity and a property of additivity.
Introduction
Consider a group of agents demanding a particular service which is provided by a common supplier, called the source. Agents can be served through connections to the source, either directly or via other agents. Connections are costly. These situations are studied in the literature on "minimum cost spanning tree problems". Many real examples can be modeled in this way. For example, Bergantiños and Lorenzo (2004) studied a real situation where villagers had to pay the cost of constructing pipes from their respective houses to a water supply. Other examples are communication networks, such as telephone, Internet, wireless telecommunication, or cable television.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we start with some preliminaries about minimum cost spanning tree problems. In Section 3 we characterize the Kruskal sharing rules. Section 4 connects the Kruskal sharing rules with solutions for cooperative games.
Minimum cost spanning tree problems
In this section we introduce minimum cost spanning tree problems.
Let N ⊂ N = {1, 2, . . .} be the set of all possible agents. Given a finite subset N ⊂ N , an order π on N is a bijection π : N −→ {1, . . . , |N|} where, for each i ∈ N, π(i) is the position of agent i. Let Π N denote the set of all orders on N. Given π ∈ Π N , P re(i, π) denotes the set of elements of N which come before i according to π, i.e., P re(i, π) = {j ∈ N | π(j) < π(i)}.
Given π ∈ Π N and S ⊂ N, let π S denote the order induced by π on S.
We deal with networks whose nodes are elements of a set N 0 = N ∪ {0}, where N is the set of agents and 0 is a special node called the source. We consider N = {1, . . . , n}.
A cost matrix C = (c ij ) i,j∈N 0 gives the cost of a direct link between any two nodes. We assume symmetric costs, i.e., for each i, j ∈ N 0 , c ij = c ji ≥ 0 and for each i ∈ N 0 , c ii = 0.
We denote the set of all cost matrices with agent set N by C N . Given C, C ′ ∈ C N we say that C ≤ C ′ if for each i, j ∈ N 0 , c ij ≤ c ′ ij . A minimum cost spanning tree problem, briefly referred to as an mcstp, is a pair (N 0 , C) where N ⊂ N is a finite set of agents, 0 is the source, and C ∈ C N is a cost matrix. Given an mcstp (N 0 , C) and S ⊂ N, we denote the restriction of the mcstp to S 0 = S ∪ {0} by (S 0 , C). A network g over N 0 is a subset of {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N 0 , i = j}. The elements of g are called arcs. Since we assume symmetric costs, we work with undirected arcs, i.e., (i, j) = (j, i). Given a network g and a pair of distinct nodes i and j, a path from i to j in g is a sequence of distinct arcs g ij = {(i s−1 , i s )} p s=1 that satisfy (i s−1 , i s ) ∈ g for each s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, i = i 0 and j = i p . A cycle is a path from i to i. Given i, j ∈ N 0 , we say that i, j are connected in g if there exists a path from i to j.
A tree is a network such that for each i ∈ N, there is a unique path from i to the source.
We denote the set of all networks over N 0 by G N and the set of networks over N 0 in such a way that every agent in N is connected to the source by G N 0 . Given a network g we say that S ⊂ N 0 is a connected component if two conditions hold. Firstly, for each i, j ∈ S, i and j are connected in g. Secondly, S is maximal, i.e., for each T ⊂ N 0 with S T , there exist i, j ∈ T , i = j, such that i and j are not connected in g. Note that the set of connected components is a partition of N 0 .
The following definitions appear in Norde et al. (2004) . We say that i, j ∈ S ⊂ N 0 , i = j are (C, S)-connected if there exists a path g ij from i to j such that for each (k, l) ∈ g ij , k, l ∈ S and c kl = 0. We say that S ⊂ N 0 is a C-component if two conditions hold. Firstly, for each i, j ∈ S, i and j are (C, S)-connected. Secondly, S is maximal, i.e., for each T ⊂ N 0 with S T , there exist i, j ∈ T , i = j, such that i and j are not (C, T )-connected. The set of C-components is a partition of N 0 (Norde et al., 2004) .
Every mcstp can be written as a non-negative combination of mcstp in which the costs of the arcs are 0 or 1 (Norde et al., 2004) . The next lemma states this result in a slightly different but equivalent way, using our notation.
q=1 of cost matrices and a family {x q } m(C) q=1 of non-negative real numbers satisfying three conditions:
(2) For each q ∈ {1, . . . , m(C)}, there exists a network g q such that c
Given an mcstp (N 0 , C) and g ∈ G N , we define the cost of g as
When there is no ambiguity, we write c(g) or c(C, g) instead of c(N 0 , C, g).
A minimal tree for (N 0 , C), briefly referred to as an mt, is a tree t ∈ G N 0 such that c(t) = min g∈G N 0 c(g). An mt always exists, although it may not be unique. Given an mcstp (N 0 , C), m(N 0 , C) denotes the cost of any mt t in (N 0 , C).
Given an mcstp (N 0 , C) and an mt t, the minimal network (N 0 , C t ) associated with t is defined as follows (Bird, 1976) :
{c kl }, where g ij denotes the unique path in t from i to j. The same minimal network is obtained if we consider a different mt for the original mcstp (Aarts and Driessen, 1993) .
The irreducible form of an mcstp (N 0 , C) is defined as the minimal network (N 0 , C * ) = (N 0 , C t ) associated with a particular mt t (Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2007b) . If
is an irreducible form, we say that C * is an irreducible matrix. Moreover, C * ≤ C. Note that a matrix is irreducible if reducing the cost of any arc, the cost of connecting agents to the source is also reduced.
After obtaining an mt, one of the most important issues addressed in the literature on mcstp is how to divide its cost m(N 0 , C) among the agents. A cost allocation rule is a map ψ that associates with each mcstp
denotes its payment.
A characterization of Kruskal sharing rules
Kruskal sharing rules are defined following Kruskal's algorithm (1956) . The idea behind this algorithm is to construct a tree by sequentially adding arcs with the lowest cost without introducing cycles. Formally, Kruskal's algorithm is defined as follows.
We start with
several arcs satisfying this condition, select just one). We have that
Stage p+1. We have defined the sets A p (C) and 1. g p (C) ∪ {(i, j)} contains a cycle. Go to the beginning of Stage p+1 with
This algorithm is completed in n stages. It leads to a tree, which may not be unique. We say that a minimal tree g n (C) obtained at the end of Step n in the Kruskal algorithm is a Kruskal tree. When there is no ambiguity, we write A p , g p , and
k=1 denote the unique partition of N 0 in connected components induced by g. Formally,
• If i, j ∈ T k (g), i and j are connected in g.
• If i ∈ T k (g), j ∈ T l (g) and k = l, i and j are not connected in g. Given a network g and i ∈ N 0 , let S(P (g), i) denote the element of P (g) to which i belongs. Tijs et al. (2006) introduce Kruskal sharing rules for mcstp. We present this definition in a different but equivalent way, using our notation.
Let N ⊂ N and S ⊂ N 0 . A sharing function, o, is a map defined as follows:
• if 0 ∈ S, for each i ∈ S \ {0}, o i (S) = 0.
• if 0 / ∈ S, o(S) ∈ ∆(S) = {x ∈ R S + : i∈S x i = 1} and for each S ⊂ T , and each The cost of this arc is paid by the agents involved in the connected component to which the agents i p , j p belong, except for those who were connected to the source before its construction. Each of these agents pays the difference between his share before the arc is added to the network and after it is added.
We now define Kruskal sharing rules formally. Given an mcstp (N 0 , C), let g n be a
Kruskal tree. For each i ∈ N,
Note that, from the definition of Kruskal sharing rules, it is not clear that φ o is a cost allocation rule for mcstp. For instance, φ o could depend on the selected Kruskal tree. Tijs et al. (2006) proved that each Kruskal sharing rule φ o is a well-defined rule.
In the next example we calculate the family of Kruskal sharing rules related to an mcstp. In this example, there are two different Kruskal trees.
Example 1 Consider the mcstp (N 0 , C) described in Figure 1 . Following Kruskal's algorithm, we choose, as it is shown in the figure, the mt {(1, 2), (2, 3), (0, 1)}.
In the next table we describe the quantity assigned to each agent at each step. 
Finally, we obtain
Note that if we consider the other Kruskal tree, given by {(2, 3), (1, 2), (0, 1)}, we obtain the same result because Kruskal sharing rules are well-defined (Tijs et al., 2006) .
Next, we give the first characterization of the family of Kruskal sharing rules. This characterization is based on a property of monotonicity over the set of agents and a property of additivity defined in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2008) . This result holds for any set of possible agents N except for two-agent sets. In this situation, it is sufficient to add the property of non-negativity.
This property implies that if some agents leave no remaining agent should be better off than before.
Additivity is a standard property and it has been used in many situations. In the case of mcstp, additivity says that if we have two mcstp (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C ′ ) then,
The following example shows that no rule satisfies this property.
Example 2 For this reason Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2008) introduce the constrained additivity property. In order to define this property we need to introduce the concept of similar problems.
, and (N 0 , C + C ′ ) and an order π = (i 1 , . . . , i n ) ∈ Π N such that
n in , i.e., the arcs in the mt t are ordered in the same way in both problems. Note that two similar problems share at least one mt.
Constrained additivity (CA): For each pair of similar mcstp (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C ′ ), we have
From a mathematical point of view, CA is an appealing property because if a rule is additive the initial problem can be decomposed in a sum of simpler problems which are usually easier to solve. So, an additive rule is easier to compute. Besides, in many problems it is possible to characterize rules with additivity and very "basic" properties.
For example, the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b) , one of the most important solutions for games with transferable utility, is characterized by means of additivity, efficiency, symmetry, and dummy player. There are many values satisfying efficiency, symmetry, and dummy player, for example the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) , but the Shapley value is the only one which satisfies additivity.
Moreover, given an mcstp (N 0 , C), assume that some additional costs that were not considered in the initial problem appear. Besides, assume that the mcstp associated with these extra costs is similar to (N 0 , C). Then, CA says that the cost allocation provided by the rule should be the same if the problem is reevaluated considering these extra costs or if we sum up the initial allocation and the allocation of these extra costs.
Non-negativity (NN): For each mcstp (N 0 , C) and each i ∈ N, ψ i (N 0 , C) ≥ 0.
Below, we introduce two interesting properties, which are also satisfied by Kruskal sharing rules.
Strong Cost Monotonicity (SCM): For each pair of mcstp (N 0 , C) and
This property implies that if some connection costs increase, no agent ends up better off. It was introduced by Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007b) . Tijs et al. (2006) proved that Kruskal sharing rules satisfy SCM.
Continuity (CON): ψ is a continuous function of C.
Lemma 2 Consider an mcstp (N 0 , C) and
q=1 satisfying the conditions of Lemma 1. Then, the mcstp
q=1 are similar.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an mt t = {(i 0 , i)} i∈N in (N 0 , C) and assume, without loss of generality, that
and for each q = 1, . . . , m(C), c
Proposition 1 Kruskal sharing rules satisfy NN, PM, CA, and CON.
Proof.
Kruskal sharing rules satisfy NN by definition. Kruskal sharing rules satisfy PM (Tijs et al., 2006) . To show that Kruskal sharing rules satisfy CA, we consider two similar mcstp (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C ′ ). Assume, without loss of generality, that t = {(i 0 , i)} i∈N is a common mt for both mcstp such that c 1 0 1 ≤ c 2 0 2 ≤ . . . ≤ c n 0 n and c
Furthermore, Kruskal sharing rules are independent of the chosen Kruskal tree (Tijs et al., 2006) . Therefore, given a Kruskal sharing rule φ o ,
In the case of CON, we define for each mcstp (N 0 , C) and each ǫ > 0, the mcstp (N 0 , C +ǫ ) and (N 0 , C −ǫ ), where for each i, j ∈ N 0 , c +ǫ ij = c ij +ǫ and c
The allocation generated by the Kruskal sharing rule in the mcstp
On the other hand, the allocation generated by the Kruskal sharing rule in the mcstp
Consider now the sequence of cost matrices {C ǫ } such that for each i, j ∈ N 0 ,
Since Kruskal sharing rules satisfy SCM (Tijs et al., 2006) ,
Theorem 1 Suppose that |N | ≥ 3. A rule ψ satisfies PM and CA if and only if for each mcstp
whereô is the sharing function defined, for each S ∈ 2 N \ {∅}, bŷ
Existence. Proposition 1 proves that Kruskal sharing rules satisfy PM and CA.
Uniqueness. Consider a rule ψ satisfying PM and CA. We divide the proof in several claims.
Claim 1ô is a sharing function.
Proof of Claim 1.
As ψ satisfies PM, for each S ⊂ T ∈ 2 N \ {∅} and each i ∈ S,ô i (T ) ≤ô i (S).
Moreover, since for each S ∈ 2 N \ {∅}, m(S 0 , C) = 1, if for each S ∈ 2 N \ {∅} and each i ∈ S,ô i (S) ≥ 0, then the vectorô(S) belongs to the simplex in R S .
Suppose that S = {i}, with i ∈ N. We know thatô i (S) = ψ i (S 0 , C) = 1. Next, suppose that |S| > 1. In this case, by PM, for each i ∈ S and each j ∈ S \ {i},
q=1 satisfying the conditions of Lemma 1. Since ψ satisfies CA, by Lemma 2,
. By Proposition 1, Kruskal sharing rules satisfy CA. Thus,
Claim 2 Consider a sharing function o and an mcstp (N 0 , C) such that there exists a network g with c ij = x ≥ 0 if (i, j) ∈ g and c ij = 0 otherwise. Let {T r } m r=1 be the partition of N 0 in C-components. Then, for each i ∈ T r and each r = 1, . . . , m,
Proof of Claim 2. Given a sharing function o, let us consider the Kruskal sharing rule φ o . If we apply Kruskal's algorithm, we assume that in the first n − m stages the agents in each component are connected to one another, i.e., P (g n−m ) = {T r } m r=1 . Since for each p = 1, . . . , n − m, c i p j p = 0 and o i (T ) = 0 when the source is in T , we distinguish two cases:
2. 0 / ∈ T r . At Stage n − m + 1 of Kruskal's algorithm, it is possible to select the arc (i n−m+1 , j n−m+1 ) such that i n−m+1 ∈ T r and j n−m+1 = 0. Therefore, for each 
Thus, for each i ∈ T r and each r = 1, . . . , m, ψ i (N 0 , C) = ψ i ((T r ) 0 , C).
We define two cost matricesC andC bỹ
Note that ((T r ) 0 ,C) and ((T r ) 0 ,C) are similar and that C =C +C. By CA,
Since for each i ∈ T r and each r = 1, . . . , m, m((T r ) 0 ,C) = 0 and m({i} 0 ,C) = 0, by PM, for each i ∈ T r and each r = 1, . . . , m, ψ i ((T r ) 0 ,C) = ψ i ({i} 0 ,C) = 0. Therefore, for each r = 1, . . . , m, ψ((T r ) 0 , C) = ψ((T r ) 0 ,C).
We distinguish two cases:
Case 1. 0 ∈ T r . We have to prove that for each i ∈ T r , ψ i (N 0 , C) = 0 = φô i (N 0 , C).
We distinguish two subcases: Subcase 1.a. For each i ∈ T r , c i0 = 0. In this case,
Subcase 1.b. There exist j, k ∈ T r such that c 0j = 0 and c 0k = x.
Following similar arguments to Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2008), we con-
, and
such that c 0j = c ij = 0 and c 0i = x.
Since m({i, j} 0 , C) = 0, we assume that
We prove that ψ j ({i, j} 0 , C) = 0.
As |N | ≥ 3, consider the mcstp ({i, j, k} 0 , C ′ ) such that c ′ 0i = x and c
Case 2. 0 / ∈ T r . In this case, for each i ∈ T r , c 0i = x.
We know that ψ((T
We distinguish two subcases:
where p, q ∈ N. Since ψ satisfies CA, it is straightforward that ψ((T r ) 0 , x C) = xψ((T r ) 0 , C).
There exists {x p } p∈N such that for each p ∈ N, 0 < x p < x, x p ∈ Q + and lim p→∞ x p = x. Thus, for each p ∈ N and each i ∈ T r ,
Since the mcstp ((T r ) 0 , (x − x p ) C) and ((T r ) 0 , x p C) are similar,
In addition, by PM
According to Theorem 1, we have a characterization of the family of Kruskal sharing rules when |N | ≥ 3. Moreover, we have obtained an expression for the sharing function associated with a Kruskal sharing rule. For any set of possible agents N , we have similar results if we add NN.
Theorem 2 A rule ψ satisfies PM, CA, and NN if and only if
Proof.
Existence. By Proposition 1, Kruskal sharing rules satisfy PM, CA, and NN.
Uniqueness.
Consider a rule ψ satisfying PM, CA, and NN. If |N | ≥ 3, we invoke Theorem 1 and, if |N | = 2, we follow the procedure used in Theorem 1 except for the mcstp ({i, j} 0 , C) with c 0j = c ij = 0 and c 0i = x. In this case, applying NN and considering that ψ i ({i, j} 0 , C) + ψ j ({i, j} 0 , C) = 0, we obtain
The properties stated in Theorem 2 are independent.
• The equal division rule, δ i (N 0 , C) = • Consider the subset of orders
Let β be the rule defined, for each i ∈ N, by
This rule satisfies PM and NN. However, it violates CA. Indeed, let N = {1, 2}
and consider the cost matrices The msctp (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C ′ ) are similar, but
• Finally, consider the rule γ defined by 1. If N has at least three members, for each
Since the Shapley value satisfies additivity (Shapley, 1953a) , the rule γ satisfies CA. For PM, we only need to prove that it is satisfied when |N | ≤ 2 because Sh(N, v C * ) satisfies PM (Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2007b) .
As the remaining cases are straightforward, we can assume that N = {i, j} and c 0i ≤ c 0j . We must prove that γ i (N 0 , C) ≤ c 0i and γ j (N 0 , C) ≤ c 0j . We distinguish three cases:
3. c ij ≤ c 0i ≤ c 0j . We have that ).
Remark 1 In view of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1, if |N | ≥ 3, a rule satisfying PM and CA also satisfies SCM and CON. Similarly, by Proposition 1 and Theorem 2, a rule satisfying PM, CA, and NN satisfies SCM and CON.
Kruskal sharing rules and cooperative games
In this section we study the relationship between weighted Shapley values for different TU games and Kruskal sharing rules.
A game with transferable utility, TU game, is a pair (N, v) where N ⊂ N and
A quite standard approach for defining rules in some problems is based on the theory of TU games. We first associate with each problem a TU game. In the case of mcstp, two games can be considered: the pessimistic game (Bird, 1976) and the optimistic game (Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2007a ).
• The pessimistic game associated with an mcstp (N 0 , C) is denoted by (N, v C ) .
The value of each coalition S ⊂ N is the cost of connecting agents in S to the source, assuming that agents in N \ S are not present:
• The optimistic game associated with an mcstp (N 0 , C) is denoted by (N, v + C ). The value of each coalition S ⊂ N is the cost of connecting agents in S to the source, assuming that agents in N \ S are already connected, and agents in S can connect to the source through agents in N \ S:
where for each i, j ∈ S, c +(N \S) ij = c ij and for each i ∈ S, c
Given an mcstp (N 0 , C), we can associate with it two additional TU games using its irreducible form: (N, v C * ) and (N, v + C * ). Once the associated TU game has been chosen, we can compute a solution for TU games. Thus, the rule in the original problem is defined as the solution applied to the TU game associated with the original problem.
Given a family of TU games H, a solution on H is a function f which assigns to each TU game (N, v) ∈ H the vector (f 1 (N, v) , . . . , f n (N, v)) ∈ R N , where the real number
is the payoff of i ∈ N in the game (N, v) according to f . Several solutions have been defined for TU games. One of the best known solutions is the Shapley value.
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b) assigns to each TU game (N, v) the vector Sh(N, v) where for each i ∈ N,
In the literature on mcstp, several rules have been defined using solutions for an associated TU game. For instance, Kar (2002) studied the Shapley value of (N, v C ) whereas Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007b) studied the Shapley value of (N, v C * ). Moreover, Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a) proved that Sh(N, v Shapley (1953a) introduced the family of weighted Shapley values for TU games. Each weighted Shapley value associates a payoff with each player according to a set of positive weights over the set of players. These weights are the proportions in which the players share in unanimity games. Kalai and Samet (1987) studied this family.
Given N ⊂ N and w = {w i } i∈N , we say that w is a weight system for N if for each i ∈ N, w i > 0.
Take N ⊂ N and a weight system w = {w i } i∈N . The weighted Shapley value Sh w associates with each TU game (N, v) a vector Sh
where
It is well-known that the Shapley value is a weighted Shapley value where for each i, j ∈ N, w i = w j .
Remark 2 Kalai and Samet (1987) assume that the population of agents is fixed. Thus, they define the weight system with respect to N. Since we work with population monotonicity, we can not make this assumption. Hence, we define the weight system with respect to the set of possible agents N .
From now on, we say that w = {w i } i∈N is a weight system for N if for each i ∈ N , w i > 0. Given the weight system w and N ⊂ N , we denote w N = {w i } i∈N .
We now apply the weight system to the mcstp through the optimistic and pessimistic games.
• We say that ψ is an optimistic weighted Shapley rule for mcstp if there exists a 1 Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a) proved that v
weight system w = {w i } i∈N such that for each mcstp (N 0 , C),
• We say that ψ is a pessimistic weighted Shapley rule for mcstp if there exists a weight system w = {w i } i∈N such that for each mcstp (N 0 , C),
Bergantiños and Lorenzo-Freire (2008) proved that the optimistic weighted Shapley rules are Kruskal sharing rules where the sharing function for an agent i in a coalition S is proportional to his weight, i.e., for each S ∈ 2 N \{∅} and each i ∈ S, o
These authors also define the pessimistic weighted Shapley rules, proving that the families of optimistic and pessimistic weighted Shapley rules are different. However, they do not ask whether the pessimistic weighted Shapley rules are Kruskal sharing rules or not. In this paper we study the relationship between both families, proving that the pessimistic weighted Shapley rules are also Kruskal sharing rules.
In accordance with Theorem 2, it is easy to calculate the sharing function for any Kruskal sharing rule. Then, we will apply this theorem not only to show that the pessimistic weighted Shapley rules are Kruskal sharing rules, but also to calculate the associated sharing function. The same procedure could be applied in the case of the optimistic weighted Shapley rules, obtaining the same result as Bergantiños and LorenzoFreire (2008) , but following a completely different proof.
Corollary 1 Let ϕ w be the pessimistic weighted Shapley rule associated with the weight system w. Thus, for each mcstp (N 0 , C),
where the sharing function o w N is given, for each S ∈ 2 N \ {∅} and each i ∈ S, by
Proof.
Since Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a) proved that
The weighted Shapley value satisfies additivity (Kalai and Samet, 1987) . Moreover, v (C+C ′ ) * = v C * + v C ′ * , where (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C ′ ) are two similar mcstp (Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2008) . Using these results, for each weight system w Given a cost matrix C, we know that C * ≤ C. Considering the connection costs of agents in N −j 0 , (C * ) −j ≤ C −j , where C −j denotes the restriction of C to the agents in N −j . Moreover, (C * ) −j is an irreducible matrix (Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2007b ).
Thus, (C * ) −j ≤ (C −j ) * .
On the other hand, we denote π N −j as the restriction of π to N Then, by Theorem 2, these rules are Kruskal sharing rules. To obtain the corresponding sharing function, we consider an mcstp (N 0 , C) and a weight system w. 
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